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THE GROWING DISJUNCTION BETWEEN 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION: A POSTSCRIPT 
Harry T. Edwards* 
In October 1992, in the pages of this law review, I expressed my 
deep concern about "the growing disjunction between legal education 
and the legal profession," in an article with the same title. 1 My thesis 
was as follows: 
I fear that our law schools and law firms are moving in opposite direc-
tions. The schools should be training ethical practitioners and produc-
ing scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use. The 
firms should be ensuring that associates and partners practice law in an 
ethical manner. But many law schools - especially the so-called "elite" 
ones - have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract the-
ory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy. Many law 
firms have also abandoned their place, by pursuing profit above all else. 
While the schools are moving toward pure theory, the firms are moving 
toward pure commerce, and the middle ground - ethical practice -
has been deserted by both .... 
This article is my response to ... legal academicians who disdain law 
teaching as an endeavor in pursuit of professional education. My view is 
that if law schools continue to stray from their principal mission of pro-
fessional scholarship and training, the disjunction between legal educa-
tion and the legal profession will grow and society will be the worse for 
it.2 
The response to the article has been nothing short of extraordinary. 
Humility causes me to understand that this has had more to do with 
the subject than with the author. 
In my experience, it is rare for a law review article to touch a nerve 
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1. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Pro-
fession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992). 
2. Id. at 34, 41. 
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of public reaction. I wrote "The Growing Disjunction" because I felt 
strongly that the "disjunction" of which I speak "calls into question 
our status as an honorable profession."3 In the article, I noted that I 
had heard many others express similar concerns in recent years;4 in-
deed, it was my view that, rather than saying something "wholly origi-
nal,"5 I was articulating a set of concerns that already permeated the 
legal community. I was unaware, however, that these concerns are as 
deep and widespread in the legal community as the response to the 
article suggests. 
I recognize that the article deals with some issues that many mem-
bers of the profession - for various reasons - have been unable or 
unwilling to address. Given the response to the article, however, it is 
clear that the subject of "The Growing Disjunction" does not cover 
virgin territory; the article is novel only in the sense that it has focused 
attention on matters of great concern to many. My view of the nature 
and magnitude of the problems facing the academy and the profession 
today is, of course, open to debate. 6 It may be, for instance, that I 
have overstated the negative influence of "impractical" scholars and 
scholarship. 7 But there can be little disagreement, I think, that we 
presently face a serious problem in the legal profession. As a former 
dean of an "elite" law school wrote, "[u]ndeniably, there is a great 
deal of truth in what you had to say."8 
I have several reasons to believe that the article's subject has struck 
a nerve. This symposium, of course, constitutes the most immediate 
evidence of the interest in the disjunction between the teaching and the 
practice of law. But the symposium is only one manifestation. The 
Editor-in-Chief of this law review advised me that the decision to pub-
lish a symposium was made because "[t]he response [to the article] has 
been so overwhelming"; he noted the "strong and widespread reac-
3. Id. at 34. 
4. See id. at 35. 
5. Id. at 41. 
6. Cf. THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION, AMERICAN BAR AssO· 
CIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT- AN EDUCATIONAL CON· 
TINUUM (1992) 3, 330-34 (contending that there is less a "gap" between the academy and the 
profession than a continuum of development in legal skills and values that includes law school 
and practice; nevertheless, suggesting numerous reforms in legal education). 
7. By "impractical" scholar, I mean one who "produces abstract scholarship that has little 
relevance to concrete issues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly theoretical manner." Ed-
wards, supra note 1, at 35. 
8. Law Professor #1, letter dated Nov. 25, 1992, at 1. (For the sake of convenience, and to 
preserve the anonymity of persons who wrote to me, I have identified correspondents as either 
"Law Professor#-,'' "Dean#-," "Practitioner#-," "Judge#-,'' "Student#-," or 
"Recent Graduate #-." Copies of the letters from these correspondents are on file in my 
chambers.) 
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tion" to the article, stating that "[h]arclly a day has gone by during the 
past month when we have not seen new evidence of its force, from the 
Wall Street Journal article to calls and inquiries from academics and 
law firms. "9 
My own experience has been much the same. I have been over-
whelmed with oral and written responses to the article from law 
school deans and faculty members, students, and members of the 
bench and the bar. In particular, I was amazed by the number of law 
professors who approached me to offer their views during the January 
1993 meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. Almost 
all those from whom I have heard agree that the legal community 
faces a significant problem. Further, there already has been some rec-
ognition of the problem at the institutional level: I have been told that 
a number of law schools have held or are planning to hold special 
seminars, faculty retreats, and other programs to debate the issues that 
are the subject of the article. Discussion of the article has even made 
its way into the popular legal press10 and national media. 11 
In this essay I offer a postscript to "The Growing Disjunction." It 
is not possible for me to "respond" directly to the other participants in 
this symposium, because I had no opportunity before publication to 
read what they have written. I will therefore limit myself to two tasks. 
First, I will briefly discuss several issues raised in the article. Second, 
and most important, I wish to share a representative sample of the 
responses I have received regarding the article. These responses, I 
think, provide good evidence of the magnitude of the problem that we 
face. 
I. REsPONSES TO THE ARTICLE: SOME INITIAL OBSERVATIONS 
Although much of the original article was based on my own per-
spective and experience as a practicing lawyer, law professor, and now 
judge, I also relied heavily upon a survey of my former clerks as a 
source of information about the current relationship between legal ed-
ucation and legal practice. That survey provided many additional in-
sights and illuminating examples, but its primary effect was to 
reinforce my views about the disjunction between the academy and the 
9. Letter from Gregory P. Magarian, Editor-in-Chief, Michigan Law Review, to Harry T. 
Edwards, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 1 (Jan. 13, 1993) (on file with 
author). 
10. See Eva M. Rodriguez, Critical of Legal Studies, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 30, 1992, at 6. 
11. See Ted Gest, Doing Good is Doing Well, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 22, 1993, at 
60; Junda Woo, Law Schools Accused of Ignoring Basics, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1992, at B4. 
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profession. The multitude of responses I have received regarding the 
article have, for the most part, further reinforced those views. 
Of the many observations the responses offered concerning legal 
education, three issues emerged in particular. Perhaps the problem of 
greatest concern is the growing tension in a number of law school fac-
ulties over hiring decisions, a tension born of deep divisions within 
those faculties. A number of the communications I received observed, 
with much distress, that faculties often are badly split, with the more 
traditional, practical scholars on one side of the divide, and the "law 
and,'' "impractical" scholars (almost invariably a younger lot) on the 
other side. This division in the academy is, it seems, frequently perme-
ated by rancor, contempt, and ill will. The practical scholars at times 
are befuddled, even disgusted, by what they perceive as scholarship of 
questionable quality, engulfed by obfuscatory nomenclature, with no 
apparent relevance outside of the small conversation that takes place 
among the group of legal academics who write and speak in that no-
menclature, be it critical legal studies (CLS), critical race studies, law 
and economics, or another area. For their part, the "impractical" 
scholars often view their doctrine-oriented colleagues as engaged in 
"uninteresting" work, unworthy of pursuit by true intellectuals. 
Moreover, as several responses observed, it is not uncommon for 
the "impractical" scholars to unite in a bloc that espouses a distinctive 
political agenda. As a consequence, the hiring process may be as 
much about stacking the deck in favor of a particular political position 
as it is about attracting promising, creative, productive legal minds. 
A second concern, highlighted by the responses I have received, is 
the growing imbalance in law school pedagogy, with too much empha-
sis on theory at the expense of a basic doctrinal education. This imbal-
ance, of course, is attributable in large part to the increasing number 
of "impractical" scholars on law faculties who are neither capable of, 
nor interested in, teaching doctrine-rich courses (and who, when re-
quired to teach basic first-year classes such as contracts or property, 
often abandon any attempt to instill doctrinal literacy in their stu-
dents). This growing disinterest in providing students a solid, rigorous 
foundation in doctrine seems, in some cases, to have extended beyond 
individual courses to the way in which the first-year curriculum is or-
ganized. One law professor at a major eastern school expressed dis-
may over an "experimental [first-year] section run mainly by 
'impracticals,'" which attempts to blend all of torts and contracts into 
a single, four credit-hour class.12 
12. Law Professor #2, letter dated Dec. 21, 1992, at 2. 
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Third, the responses confirmed my original fear that a good 
number of law professors are altogether uninterested in producing 
scholarship useful to practicing lawyers, judges, administrators, and 
legislators.13 Concern about the breakdown in communication be-
tween academics and practitioners came from both sides of the divide. 
A professor at a major west coast law school lamented the view of one 
of his colleagues that "legal scholars should address their work exclu-
sively to each other."14 A named partner of a major Washington, D.C., 
law firm expressed his dismay about being unable even to understand 
some of the scholarship produced today, "where words and concepts 
seem to be employed to obscure rather than inform and appear to be 
addressed to an audience of one (the author!) or perhaps a few esoteric 
colleagues."15 These comments are typical of many that I received. 
The responses I received also expressed concerns about ethical 
problems in the legal profession. Senior and managing partners from 
several major law firms emphasized the importance of preserving the 
honorable status of the profession, particularly its sense of public obli-
gation. And a number of attorneys voiced distress over the apparently 
cavalier attitude that many law schools take to teaching ethics today. 
The pool of responses I received tended to confirm in significant 
measure the concerns raised in the article; however, some questions 
were raised about the article suggesting that aspects of my thesis might 
have been misconstrued by some. Several points are worth mentioning 
to dispel possible misconceptions. First, I am not against theory or 
theoretical work. 16 In my view, the ideal law school includes "a 
healthy balance"17 of practical and theoretical teaching and scholar-
ship. Indeed, even in courses geared toward doctrinal literacy, one 
13. It seems that not all of those who appear actively to endorse the "impractical" compo-
nent of legal education necessarily take this stance in their scholarship. In particular, I have in 
mind Professor George Priest, who has advocated a "graduate school" model of the law school 
that I have already indicated I reject. See George L. Priest, The Increasing Division Between 
Legal Practice and Legal Education, 37 BuFF. L. R.Ev. 681 (1988-1989). Recently, Professor 
Priest sent me a letter discussing the Program in Civil Liability (PCL) at Yale Law School, a 
"research unit" engaged in "advanced research on civil liability topics"; the most recent confer-
ence held by the PCL, Professor Priest said, addressed "issues relating to the increasing complex-
ity of modern civil litigation." Letter from George L. Priest to Harry T. Edwards, Judge, U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 1 (Nov. 25, 1992) (on file with author). 
14. Law Professor #3, letter dated Dec. 16, 1992, at 1 (emphasis added). 
15. Practitioner #1, letter dated Nov. 25, 1992, at 1. 
16. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 35 ("I should make clear at the outset that I do not doubt 
for a moment the importance of theory in legal scholarship."); id. at 39 ("I emphasize, again, 
that a great professional school never can be antitheoretical."); id. at 65 ("I repeat that, in ad-
vancing my claim for 'doctrinal education,' I do not propose that law schools eliminate theory 
from their curricula."). 
17. Id. at 36. 
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cannot teach, or learn, without a theoretical construct. 18 
Second, I am not against interdisciplinary scholarship. I agree 
with the dean of an "elite" law school who stated to me his belief that 
"interdisciplinary work should enrich and not displace an emphasis on 
Law."19 Twenty years ago, I joined others in the decision to add psy-
chiatrists, sociologists, and economists to the law faculty at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, and I spent a number of years team-teaching with 
psychiatrists. Then, as now, it should be clear that research and teach-
ing in courses ranging from criminal law to negotiation are signifi-
cantly enhanced by the insights of, for instance, psychology and 
sociology. Many other examples could be cited; but, as I have empha-
sized, that does not mean that "[t]he entire array of graduate schools 
[should] be duplicated, in microcosm, in the law school."20 
Third, I am not interested in "trashing" CLS. Nor do I oppose the 
work of scholars devoted to critical race theory or feminist legal stud-
ies. I continue to believe that "critical" scholars "have the potential to 
be valuable additions to the law school. [Such] scholars have provided 
a critical, anti-establishment view that, in the past, was largely absent 
from the law schools."21 What troubles me most about some adher-
ents of CLS is that their attempts to expose fundamental flaws in our 
legal system are not accompanied by any comprehensible suggestions 
for reform. This is truly ironic, for it is distinctively the lawyer's do-
main (unlike, say, that of the political philosopher) to deal with con-
crete, institutional realities.22 
18. For example, I do not see how one could effectively teach a course in federal courts 
without considerable discussion about theories of federal jurisdiction, such as the one developed 
by Professor Hart. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953) (Congress' excep-
tions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may not "destroy the essential role" of 
the Court). 
19. Dean #1, letter dated Dec. 4, 1992, at 1. 
20. Edwards, supra note l, at 56. For a discussion of practical interdisciplinary scholarship 
in the area of mental health law, see David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing 
Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAVORIAL ScI. & L. 17 (1993). Professor Wexler ana-
lyzes a number of articles - directed to judges, legislators, and other public decisionmakcrs -
that address concrete problems in mental health law. See id. at 21-28. 
21. Edwards, supra note 1, at 49. 
22. In suggesting that legal scholarship should seek to solve concrete problems, I do not 
mean that legal scholarship properly consists of political tract-writing: 
Some of the propositions of critical ... studies are removed not only from legal analysis, 
but from the idea of scholarship. When organized labor is tacitly criticized for its failure to 
form a political party, or when the call is made to restructure the "Western wage labor 
system" we are not being offered disciplinary propositions about law; and legal periodicals 
seem curious pulpit& for these appeals. 
Matthew W. Finkin, Reflections on Labor Law Scholarship and Its Discontents: The Re~·eries of 
Monsieur Verog, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1101, 1145 (1992) (footnotes omitted). Professor Finkin's 
article highlights, with both force and humor, many of 'the problems of contemporary legal 
scholarship. 
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Finally, I do not believe that legal education should be structured 
to prepare students only for appearing before judges. Most lawyers 
rarely appear in court, and we should not design the entire law school 
curriculum as if the opposite were true. Nor do I believe that an em-
phasis on the practical in legal education should be limited to doctrine. 
The value of high quality clinical courses is self-evident. Likewise, 
courses focused on the legislative and executive branches enable stu-
dents to consider important policy questions, understand problems re-
lated to drafting and enacting legislation, and develop the ability to 
deal with executive enforcement measures and administrative regula-
tions. Further, it would be immensely useful if law schools offered 
courses designed to train students how to manage legal institutions, 
since the delivery of quality legal services often depends upon the qual-
ity of the organization in which a lawyer works. In short, I do not, 
endorse the study of doctrine to the exclusion of all else. 
II. A SAMPLE OF THE REsPONSES FROM THE LEGAL 
COMMUNITY 
My principal thesis has been set forth and defended in detail in 
"The Growing Disjunction." Thus, there is no point in rehashing ar-
guments that I already have made. Rather, I think it more useful to 
share selections from some of the numerous unsolicited responses I 
have received, from all quarters of the legal community, regarding the 
original article. Most of the respondents expressed concerns similar to 
mine; not all were in agreement with me, however, so I have included 
some dissenting voices as well.23 I am well aware that this sample 
could be construed as "biased," for those who agreed with the article 
may have been more likely to communicate with me than those who 
did not. Therefore, I can say no more than that this collection of re-
sponses is illustrative, not authoritative. 
I have organized the respondents' remarks into five categories: (1) 
law school deans, (2) law school faculty members, (3) students and 
recent graduates, (4) members of the bar, and (5) judges. Classifying 
the various sources of the responses by position not only highlights the 
distinct perspectives of each group but, more importantly, emphasizes 
the striking similarities in the concerns expressed across groups. To 
preserve the anonymity of the respondents, I have omitted the names 
of individuals and institutions. 
23. I have heard from many more people than I am able to cite. The responses presented 
here are, I believe, a fair sample of those that I received. 
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A. Law School Deans 
Because of their institutional responsibilities, the deans who wrote 
or spoke to me predictably discussed, first and foremost, their con-
cerns about hiring new faculty members; a number also addressed the 
issue of "impractical" scholarship. A few were content simply to offer 
brief notes of praise ("spectacular" was the excessive accolade from 
the dean of a major east coast law school24) or concurrence ("I . . . 
agree with much of what you say," as the dean of one "elite" law 
school put it25). 
The dean of another "elite" law school offered this perspective on 
the influx of interdisciplinary and theory-oriented scholars and the in-
fluence those scholars will have on the next generation of academics: 
In my judgment, the problem began in the late '60's when an increasing 
number of individuals who aspired to become history professors or eco-
nomics professors or philosophy professors or political science professors 
or literature professors discovered that there were few, if any, opportuni-
ties in those fields. After spending several years doing graduate work, 
they finally faced reality and attended law school. 
Most of these individuals had no real interest in law or in becoming a 
lawyer, but many were excellent students. As a result, they were hired 
by law faculties, particularly in the elite schools, in increasing numbers. 
After obtaining tenure, many of them began moving back towards their 
real academic interests - philosophy, political science, economics, his-
tory, literature, etc. This led to an explosion of interdisciplinary work in 
law, as well as to an increasing rejection of the importance of doctrinal 
analysis even in mainstream courses. 
Today, this generation of scholars is dominant in legal education, 
and their priorities hold sway. Moreover, the problem is compounded 
by the fact that these very same academics tend to encourage only those 
of their students who are themselves interested in interdisciplinary work 
to consider careers in academia. And those students who are not inter-
ested in interdisciplinary work, but are merely extraordinarily talented 
lawyers, shy away from a career in the academy because they know that 
the kind of work that they would be interested in doing is not valued. As 
a consequence, virtually all of the applicants law schools like ours re-
ceive for positions in teaching come from individuals with a strong inter-
disciplinary bent. Although I regard interdisciplinary work as valuable, 
it should always be an enhancement of, rather than a substitute for, more 
traditional legal scholarship. In any event, the problem becomes self-
perpetuating. 26 
Although the majority of law school professors' responses are cited 
in section Il.B, I include two of those responses here because they 
24. Dean #7, letter dated Nov. 30, 1992, at 1. 
25. Dean #2, letter dated Dec. 22, 1992, at 1. 
26. Dean #1, letter dated Dec. 4, 1992, at 2. 
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follow so naturally from the letter just quoted. The first of these let-
ters is from a professor at a major eastern law school, who attempts to 
identify the political and ideological dimension of the shift in faculty 
interests and the attendant influence on the hiring process: 
Many, although not all, of the legal theorists would like to bring about a 
radical transformation of society. In many cases, their work amounts to 
an attack on classical liberalism, which they would like to see replaced 
with a philosophical or political theory that will lead to a much more 
egalitarian society. These professors think they can accomplish their 
goal not only through their scholarship, but also by indoctrinating their 
students and by having the law school and the university take official 
positions on their side of controversial issues of public policy .... These 
latter methods will not work well unless like-minded professors domi-
nate the faculty. Thus, it is critical that professors who tend to accept 
the status quo be excluded from the faculty or at least have their influ-
ence minimized. 
I believe that professors who are interested in engaging in practical 
scholarship generally tend to desire incremental change rather than radi-
cal change. These professors are likely to teach their students that our 
present legal system is not irredeemably flawed and corrupt; rather, it 
has many desirable features and often works quite well. In addition, 
these professors cannot be counted upon always to toe the line and sup-
port the theorists' proposed faculty resolutions on issues of public policy. 
Finally, "practical" scholars are often unsympathetic to the scholarship 
of the pure theorists, some of which they might regard as political tract-
writing masquerading as legal scholarship. Thus, if the theorists vote to 
appoint a "practical" scholar to the faculty, they might find it more diffi-
cult to gain faculty support in the future for the appointment of another 
like-minded theorist. These reasons, I think, are a significant part of the 
explanation of why many legal theorists are hostile to practical scholar-
ship and practical pedagogy.21 
The hiring environment described by the foregoing two letters has 
led a preeminent treatise writer and chaired professor of law at a ma-
jor law school to believe that his chances would be dim were he seek-
ing a teaching job today: 
The developments you describe are certainly quite apparent here at 
my school, and I am sure that we are far from the worst. If I were 
leaving a clerkship and hoping to enter the teaching market today, with 
exactly the credentials I had 42 years ago, I am absolutely confident that 
I could not be hired on this faculty. Indeed ... I feel reasonably confi-
dent that I would not even be invited here for interviews. 
I can well imagine the Appointments Committee sniffing over my 
27. Law Professor #4, letter dated Dec. 22, 1992, at 1-2; see also Mark Tushnet, Critical 
Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1516 (1991) (The author argues that 
"critical legal studies is a political location for a group of people on the Left who share the 
project of supporting and extending the domain of the Left in the legal academy."). 
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application. "Second in the class at [an elite institution]. There are lots 
of people with that kind of credential." "Officer of the [law review]. But 
we have editors-in-chief that we are not even bringing down." "Clerk 
for [a noted federal appellate judge]. He is a good enough circuit judge, 
but think of all the Supreme Court clerks we have interviewed." Then 
would come the final and fatal blow: "His only degree is an LL.B. I 
think we shoul[d] be looking for people who have a second degree in 
something other than law."28 
I think it self-evident that this series of letters describes a deeply 
troubling state of affairs in the hiring of young professors, and the 
responses of several deans indicate that I am not alone in this view. 
The dean of a small law school in the northwest offered an anecdote 
that illustrates the problems a would-be "traditional" legal scholar 
may face in seeking academic employment: 
I agree with most of what you have to say, and it brings to mind a whim-
sical recounting of the faculty hiring process at another school, passed 
along by one of our recent [visiting scholars]. A superior candidate came 
through the process, but the candidate ran into substantial opposition 
from a powerful sub-set of the faculty who complained that the candi-
date was not committed to "law and something." The apt response from 
our [visiting scholar] was: "Oh yes. The candidate is committed to law 
and law. " 29 
Given the attitude among faculty that a young scholar must have 
"something" up his or her sleeve in addition to law, it is probably not 
remarkable that so many of those who seek teaching positions today 
style themselves as "law and" scholars or theoreticians. It may even 
be that some potential scholars who are interested in "law and law" 
are marketing themselves as something "more" in order to be hired, a 
view suggested by the dean of a large law school in the midwest: 
In recent years, I have been struck by the number of young legal 
scholars who seem to be much more inclined towards what you charac-
terize as impractical scholarship. . . . I participated on a panel at the 
AALS Faculty Recruitment Conference earlier this month and had an 
opportunity to meet another crop of potential faculty members. Based 
on some of my conversations with these and other young scholars, I am 
still not sure whether their commitment to CLS, critical race theory, [or] 
feminist legal theory is sincere or whether these young people have 
somehow been convinced or have convinced themselves that this is the 
only way to make a mark in legal education. 30 
A discouraging assessment indeed. 
Certain of the deans who responded to the article also had much to 
say about the closely related issue of "impractical" professors' distaste, 
28. Law Professor #5, letter dated Dec. 23, 1992, at 1-2. 
29. Dean #3, letter dated Dec. 8, 1992, at 1. 
30. Dean #4, letter dated Nov. 25, 1992, at 1. 
August 1993] A Postscript 2201 
even contempt, for doctrinal scholarship, and their rejection of the ex-
isting legal system. This attitude deeply concerned the dean of a well-
regarded law school on the east coast, formerly a chaired professor at 
an "elite" law school: 
I agree wholeheartedly with most of what you say and embrace the 
overall substance of your thesis. . . . 
What I find odd is that so many in the legal education profession are 
members of a tight-knit group that is just "out of it." Academic life 
simply takes these people away from reality .... 
The notion that the analysis of cases, the discussion of doctrinal con-
cepts, the support for the existing legal system while trying to make it 
work better, [are] somehow immoral and anti-intellectual drives me up 
the wall. The so-called "theory" that is so much in vogue today as the 
basis for what is written is often (though not inevitably) pure garbage. 
Sorry, I mean impure garbage! 
Law schools should not be mere trade schools; they are places of 
higher learning. But they should deal with the realities of the procedural 
and substantive laws that are vital to the functioning of our world and 
the preservation of what is best about it. For those who only want to 
thrash about in the "nether regions," trashing everyone and everything 
who is productive, we need to develop a new school of legal thought and 
theory in our universities. Let those who are involved spend their time 
doing their idle musings, but don't pretend that their graduates are quali-
fied to take the bar and enter the legal profession.31 
Not every dean, however, believed that the problems discussed in 
the original article affected his or her law school. One dean from an 
"elite" law school was quite sanguine about the shared sense of pur-
pose at his institution: 
Although I do not agree with every point you make (in particular, I am 
skeptical about the ability oflaw schools to teach legal ethics effectively), 
the basic thrust of your argument is right on target. You may be sur-
prised to learn, however, that I say this with a sense of some self-con-
gratulation. Although too many lawyers and judges do not know it, [our 
law school] prides itself on coming closest to the vision you offer of a 
sound legal education. We have long held the view ... that the fiist and 
foremost responsibility of a law school is to train its students to the pro-
fession of law and to contribute in a meaningful way to scholarly re-
search about the profession. This is not to say, of course, that we do not 
value interdisciplinary approaches to law .... But it has consistently 
been our view that interdisciplinary work should enrich and not displace 
an emphasis on Law.32 
This dean was not entirely alone in his more upbeat assessment. 
The dean at a small east coast law school wrote me twice, and his first 
letter reflected a cautiously positive outlook: 
31. Dean #5, letter dated Dec. 3, 1992, at 1-2. 
32. Dean #1, letter dated Dec. 4, 1992, at 1. 
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[The ABA Task Force Report33] concluded that there is not so much 
an absolute gap - and certainly not divergence as to objectives - as 
there is an unappreciated continuum of professional growth from law 
school through a lawyer's career. I suggest the disjunction you and your 
clerks perceive is neither as universal nor as intractable as you think. A 
perusal of our library shelves tells me there is no shortage of "practical" 
scholarship in the law reviews and elsewhere, and I know how pro-
foundly our faculty struggles to assure that our curriculum balances doc-
trinal analysis, theoretical frameworks, skills training, and ethical 
sensitivity. I suspect a survey of deans, or even of professors, would find 
many more sharing your vision than not. 34 
I wrote back to this dean, telling him that although I respected his 
opinion, very few of those from whom I had heard concurred with his 
view. A second letter from the dean arrived soon afterwards, stating 
that my message had "deflated" him. He added: 
I revise my position somewhat. The enclosed article from [an elite 
law review] came to me recently. It is strong evidence for your position. 
I do not know [the author] and do not mean to denigrate his knowledge 
or skills. But, even after struggling to understand it, I do not immedi-
ately grasp how his [100]-page article in an elite journal is likely to be 
helpful to mainstream practitioners. 35 
In sum, if the responses I received from deans are even moderately 
representative of the concerns of their counterparts at other institu-
tions, then there is no dearth of support among law school leaders for 
the view that there is a serious disjunction between the academy and 
the profession. 
B. Law School Faculty Members 
It is perhaps not surprising that the majority of the responses I 
received came from law professors, given that a principal focus of 
"The Growing Disjunction" is law school faculties. Although some of 
the respondents did not take my position, an extraordinary number of 
them - from assistant professors at regional schools to preeminent 
scholars at elite institutions - did agree that there is a tremendous 
problem to be addressed. A number of respondents were terse in their 
comments. For example, a former president of the Association of 
American Law Schools, who is now a chaired professor of law at a 
well-regarded east coast law school, expressed hope that the article 
would contribute to "help[ing] legal education get itself out of its intel-
lectual cul-de-sac."36 Another chaired professor of law at a major law 
33. See supra note 6. 
34. Dean #6, letter dated Nov. 24, 1992, at 1. 
35. Dean #6, letter dated Jan. 19, 1993, at 1. 
36. Law Professor #6, letter dated Dec. 23, 1992, at 1. 
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school on the east coast wrote: "I love your article. It reminds me of 
many of the reasons I left [an 'elite' law school] . . . . As someone with 
one foot in each camp (doctrine and big-think) I really appreciate your 
expressing these thoughts in print."37 
Many other letters offered more elaborate comment. I begin with 
a renowned treatise writer and chaired professor of law at a major law 
school who expressed, in emphatic terms, his belief that the recent 
decline in practical scholarship carries with it highly detrimental 
consequences: 
I think that what you say is exactly right. Legal education is moving 
away from the needs of the legal profession, it is doing so at an increas-
ing pace, and this is a great loss. If you believe, as I do with all my heart, 
that the rule of law is indispensable to a civilized society, then we need 
good lawyers to be handmaidens of the law and good lawyers must un-
derstand doctrine and the "practical" side of the law as well as under-
standing theory.38 
This treatise writer's concern was reflected in many respondents' 
attempts to explain and analyze the trend away from traditional, doc-
trinal scholarship and toward interdisciplinary and highly theoretical 
work. Perhaps the harshest view of the growing emphasis on "imprac-
tical" scholarship came from a professor of law at a major law school 
on the east coast: 
[Y]ou may have been too easy on the "impractical ·scholars." You are 
quite right to point out that they want to tum law schools into what I 
like to call "Graduate Schools of Legal and Other Studies," but they 
want to be paid like law professors rather than university professors. 
The salaries at law schools are two or three times what universities pay 
their grad-school professors. Someone receiving an economics or philos-
ophy or you-name-it Ph.D. can go to law school, obtain a J.D., and then 
go into "law &" teaching at a law school and earn two or three times 
what they would earn in grad school, while teaching (and researching) 
exact[ly] what they would teach or research in grad school. 
So what we have here is an incredible scam. Our "impractical schol-
ars" pursue what fascinates them, and the law schools that employ them 
charge students $15,000 a year to learn stuff that will be of no use to 
them. These professors teach in order to train students who will become 
law professors (like them), which means perhaps three or four people out 
of a class of [several hundred]. The rest of the students are being bilked! 
You are absolutely on the mark when you note that at the "elite" law 
schools the "impracticals" have taken over. This has occurred through 
an unholy alliance of crits and law-and-economics people, with miscella-
neous other "law &s" chipping in. A faculty candidate who is not heav-
ily into theory has little cha[n]ce of being hired. ("Practical scholars" 
37. Law Professor #7, letter dated Dec. 11, 1992, at 1. 
38. Law Professor #5, letter dated Dec. 23, 1992, at 1. 
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are dismissed as being, to use their favored expression, 
"uninteresting. ")39 
The former dean of a large, well-regarded law school in the mid-
west, who is presently a chaired professor at a prominent southern law 
school, suggested that some young professors today may feel com-
pelled to incorporate interdisciplinary work into their scholarship, 
whether they like it or not: 
You conclude on a hopeful note (at 77) that the professoriat as a whole is 
still in control and, especially, that ·~unior professors can still ... expect 
that fine doctrinal work will suffice for tenure ... " You temper this by 
observing that their work "will probably need to have theory integrated 
with doctrine, and to take the form of law review articles rather than 
treatises." ... My problem with your statement is that you seem (and I 
may do you an injustice here) to require (advise, counsel, accept as fact, 
albeit with resignation) that the young person bow to demands to incor-
porate "Law And ... "-theoretical material, in order to ... touch all 
bases in the faculty. Unhappily, and I know you neither meant to pre-
scribe nor even to make a forecast, that may be a not too inaccurate 
statement ... of what young people face or [at] least perceive (and the 
perception makes it real in their anxiety about promotion and tenure). It 
is in this area that I am far less sanguine than you. I really do fear that 
"fine doctrinal work" will not count for what it once did.40 
Another chaired professor of law, from a large midwestem law 
school, noted that the apparently increasing pressure to focus on the-
ory or interdisciplinary work does not necessarily end with the grant-
ing of tenure: 
In the article you asked why a tenured professor cannot simply 
choose to engage in practical scholarship. I know the answer. Tenure 
guarantees only a job. Tenure does not guarantee respect among col-
leagues, salary increases from deans, or support for research and writing 
by anyone. The cost of practical scholarship, literally, can be very large, 
but your speaking out on this important subject may well reduce this 
cost.41 
As if to guarantee that the disjunction will become worse, it ap-
pears that some law professors now consider the practice of law no 
longer to be an important experience for the aspiring academic. A 
chaired professor of law at a well-regarded midwestem law school re-
lated the following: 
About five years ago, several of my colleagues interviewed a young 
woman who had graduated from [an elite east coast law school] with 
stellar credentials. She asked about the view at [our law school] regard-
ing the desirability of practice experience. [My colleagues] responded 
39. Law Professor #2, letter dated Dec. 21, 1992, at 1. 
40. Law Professor #8, letter dated Jan. 11, 1993, at 2. 
41. Law Professor #9, letter dated Dec. 17, 1992, at 2. 
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that many faculty members thought that at least some exposure to prac-
tice was very important. "That's good to hear," she replied, because she 
was seriously thinking about entering practice - but she had been ad-
vised by "friends on [her alma mater's] faculty" that practice experience 
might be considered a blot on her record!42 
Unfortunately, this professor's anecdote was not the only comment on 
this subject. A U.S. Court of Appeals judge, who also teaches at an 
"elite" law school, advised me that: 
Many of the students who apply for a clerkship with me ... are now 
telling me that what used to be the obligatory two to four years of practi-
cal experience after graduation before a return to academia is not only 
no longer required, but also may put one in disfavor if the sojourn in the 
world of practicality has lasted too long.43 
Finally, a professor of law from a law school in the west pointed 
out that these issues are not matters of concern solely at the "elite" 
law schools: 
I could not agree with you more [in believing that the academy is unin-
terested in the issues confronting the practicing lawyer] .... However, 
the problem you describe is not distinctive to [the "elite" law schools] 
since the law schools with lesser status like to imitate the more prestigi-
ous schools. 
I was warned that my law degree would not qualify me to teach his-
tory at a liberal arts college as I hoped at the time I left law school. It 
never occurred to me that I might convert this law school to a liberal 
arts college instead. How nai[]ve of me. 44 
In contrast to the respondents I have just quoted, a chaired profes-
sor of law at an "elite" law school offered a less jaded vision of the 
shift in scholarship: 
My view as an insider and as a "law .and" type (but one who has 
valued the doctrinal and the practical) is that the situation is not as bleak 
as you describe it, and that to the extent the shifts you point to exist (I 
would certainly not deny considerable movement in the directions you 
specify) there are reasons which are not very different from those that 
motivated professors in the days when doctrine was more dominant .... 
One might, of course, ask why have law professors directed more of 
their attention to the kind of work designed to influence legislatures or 
courts through ways other than the analysis of doctrine. I think this 
change in focus reflects a feature that has not changed over the years, 
coupled with something that has been perceived to change dramatically. 
What I think has not changed is that most law professors see themselves 
as critics of law who are criticizing not for its own sake (or to show off 
their intelligence) but because they want to make a difference. And at 
42. Law Professor #10, letter dated Nov. 25, 1992, at 1. 
43. Judge #1, letter dated Feb. 5, 1993, at 1. 
44. Law Professor #11, letter dated Dec. 17, 1992, at 1. 
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the elite law schools the difference professors want to make has always 
been at the highest levels, which is to say the federal courts and espe-
cially the Supreme Court. At one point (when you and I were in law 
school) it was felt that if one could show a federal court (the Supreme 
Court in particular) how the constraints of doctrine necessitated particu-
lar outcomes in apparently hard cases, the court's later decisions would 
be influenced by the professor's analysis. Today it is felt that these hard 
decisions are made by courts, even courts below the Supreme Court, on 
political more than doctrinal grounds and that these grounds reflect the 
world views that judges bring to their roles. Thus if the goal is to influ-
ence the law, doctrinal analysis appears less likely to have an important 
effect than political arguments and empirical and theoretical research 
(like law and economics) which can affect the world views of judges. 
Are those who seek to influence the law in this way wrong? You are in a 
better position to judge than I .... 
. . . Finally, and I think in the recent period most importantly, is the 
sense that our nation and the world face[] a host of serious problems 
that intersect the law but which cannot be resolved on the basis of re-
ceived legal doctrine. This has led many of our brightest young lawyers 
to seek training in other disciplines and to do work that reflects that 
training as much or more than it reflects their specifically legal training. 
These young scholars do this not because they are uninterested in the 
practical, but from the opposite motive. They think they can have the 
greatest practical effect by looking at the empirical and theoretical un-
derpinnings of doctrine and by seeking not to influence courts but rather 
to influence other private and governmental actors.45 
To the extent that the foregoing position relies on the proposition that 
judging is merely a "political" or "ideological" enterprise, I reject it.46 
Otherwise, the respondent's views reflect a scholarly ideal - wanting 
to exert a positive influence on decisionmakers at the highest levels -
with which I probably agree·. Unfortunately, based on my own exper-
iences and the vast majority of responses that I have received, this 
ideal is far from a reality today. 
A professor of law from a major law school on the west coast 
echoed the view that scholarship that is not heavily doctrinal may nev-
ertheless be "practical," partly by focusing on "governmental actors" 
outside of the judiciary: 
I don't think our views are particularly far apart. As you note in your 
article, I believe legal scholarship consists, and should consist, of recom-
mendations to public decisionmakers. [I have published an] article [that] 
makes this argument, in response to [another scholar], who argues that 
legal scholars should address their work exclusively to each other (and 
you thought [some academics were] extreme). In this sense, we agree 
that legal scholarship ought to be "practical," to use your term. But 
45. Law Professor #12, letter dated Nov. 23, 1992, at 1-3. 
46. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Princi-
pled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 837. 
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your article tends to treat such practical scholarship as equivalent to 
doctrinal scholarship; that will be true, however, only if the deci-
sionmaker who is being addressed is a judge. In our statutory, regula-
tory state, legislators and administrators have assumed a dominant role, 
and I think legal scholars limit the relevance and impact of their work if 
they fail to address these decisionrnakers. (Moreover, since much of the 
judicial role involves supervising agencies, analysis of agency decisions 
should be relevant to them as well.) But practical scholarship addressed 
to legislators and administrators cannot be primarily doctrinal, because 
these decisionrnakers think in policy, not doctrinal terms.47 
Not everyone would agree with the view that legislators and adminis-
trators "think in policy, not doctrinal terms." Indeed, in one letter I 
received, a partner in a major law firm, who has written extensively, 
argued before the Supreme Court, and participated in numerous lob-
bying efforts in Congress, directly rebuts the contention that doctrinal 
scholarship is not useful to legislators: 
[Y]ou get uncomfortably close to conceding that theoretical scholarship 
has greater utility. to the legislative than the judicial branch. I disagree 
strongly, based on my experience on the Hill. In my experience, legisla-
tors are more interested than judges in practical solutions to legislative 
problems, and far less interested in abstract legal theory. To the extent 
that doctrinal analysis presents Congress with reasoned approaches to 
concrete practical problems, it definitely is useful in the legislative pro-
cess. For example, when Congress considers revising an existing law 
(e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1991), or acts in a field where some legisla-
tion already exists (e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA]), 
judicial construction of existing legislation is highly relevant. I would 
suggest that this is the usual case, given the breadth of federal legislation. 
The one exception where doctrine has little to say lies in sketching out 
the broadest theoretical outlines for a new and novel legislative program; 
for example, deciding whether to handle pollution through incentives as 
opposed to continued government regulation. In such situations, doctri-
nal scholarship does not seem of great relevance. 
In this situation, however, I don't think theoretical scholarship has 
much to say either .... Careful consideration of practical implementa-
tion issues enables a legislature to decide which of several competing 
approaches has the greatest likelihood of success, and the greatest polit-
ical merit .... 
In my experience, the real world uncomfortably intrudes in virtually 
every legislative discussion. If you think Congress was listening to law 
professors discuss theory when it came to creating the ADA or revamp-
ing Title VII, think again. They were concerned about what works in 
the real world, and not ... whether their proposals satisfied the theoreti-
cal predilections of non-practicing law professors.48 
The point here, I think, is not that legal scholars committed to inform-
47. Law Professor #3, letter dated Dec. 16, 1992, at 1. 
48. Practitioner #3, letter dated Nov. 30, 1992, at 1-2 (footnote integrated into text). 
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ing and advising legislatures should only produce doctrine-oriented 
scholarship, but that such scholarship is plainly of use to the legisla-
tive branch. 
One chaired professor at a well-regarded midwestem law school, 
seeking to extend the debate on the meaning of "practical" scholar-
ship, suggested that neither traditional doctrinal work nor existing in-
terdisciplinary research could meet the requirements of a "new" 
practical scholarship: 
I ... see a need for some change in practical scholarship and teach-
ing. Mainly, the practical approach needs a stronger connection to un-
derlying substance, which is increasingly diverse and complex and 
demands ever finer balances among competing interests. I do not argue 
for Professor George Priest's model in which applied science or some-
thing else displaces legal doctrine. Rather, I argue for tying practical 
scholarship and practical law teaching more closely to the concrete, sub-
stantive areas that the law regulates so that the latter more fully and 
better informs the former .... My approach is fundamentally concep-
tually different from Priest's because I aim to enrich and bolster tradi-
tional pragmatism which Priest would abandon. 
I would also argue for integrating law with the overarching, supple-
mental sciences of management information and decision making. We 
train lawyers to argue positions. We do not train lawyers to judge their 
arguments. We teach lawyers to spot issues but not how to resolve 
them .... 
In the end I hope for practical generalists who will enable the law 
instead of impractical specialists who would destroy it.49 
Finally, an assistant professor of law at a small midwestem law 
school recalled, from his own time in practice (as a law clerk, an attor-
ney with the U.S. Department of Justice, and a private practitioner), 
how unprepared for practice the graduates of a number of law schools 
were: 
I've heard judges on [a federal court of appeals], representing a wide 
spectrum of philosophical and judicial views, uniformly express great 
concern with the lack of preparation exhibited by law clerks hired from 
the elite schools .... I remember judicial clerks from [various elite insti-
tutions] who candidly admitted how astonished they were to learn that 
federal judges actually cared about things like statutes and precedent and 
did not simply decide cases according [to] their subjective views of the 
best political outcome. This was not what they had been told by their 
critical legal studies professors. The naivete shown by these law clerks 
would have been amusing, had it not also been rather discouraging and 
frightening. so 
49. Law Professor #9, letter dated Dec. 17, 1992, at 1-2. 
50. Law Professor #13, letter dated Dec. 31, 1992, at 1-2. 
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The professor blamed this situation on the growing disjunction be-
tween legal education and the legal profession. 
In addition to voicing general concerns about scholarship and 
teaching, several respondents focused on the question of ethics. A few 
made clear that they shared my general view that the pressure to act 
unethically has become greater in recent years, and that law schools 
have not adequately responded to this problem by making a greater 
commitment to teaching ethics.51 One of the more in-depth considera-
tions of possible reforms in ethics teaching came from a chaired pro-
fessor at an "elite" law school: 
I despair of the law school's ability to correct the problems you mention 
through ethics education or of the profession's ability to do anything 
about ethics through testing or other certification requirements .... 
The one hope I hold out for teaching ethics in law school is that if we 
can have students rehearse specific ethical problems before they confront 
them in a pressured practice context, and if we can encourage them to 
strongly commit themselves to ethical courses of action while not under 
pressure, perhaps they will be able to hold out better when asked to do 
the unethical. This perspective suggests a very different way of teaching 
ethics than that we now engage in. Rather than teach ethical rules, I 
think we should focus on ways of acting ethically. Thus I would pay less 
attention to what the line is between ethical and unethical discovery 
practice and more to having students role play ways in which they might 
resist partners' demands that they seek discovery simply to wear down 
an opponent. 52 
I do not dispute either that teaching ethics may be an uphill battle, or 
that developing and implementing the necessary reforms will take con-
siderable effort and commitment. I am not, however, prepared to "de-
spair" over the law schools' inability to bring abc;mt positive change. I 
still remember the great teachers that I had in law school, ·who taught 
ethics as a part of their substantive course offerings. They had a pow-
erful impact on me, so I know it can be done. 
I am reluctant to attempt any summary of the views of the law 
professors from whom I have heard. Indeed, anyone familiar with the 
academy knows that it would be oxymoronic even to suggest a 
"faculty consensus" on any subject. Nonetheless, in a number of the 
letters that I received, I did note a buoyant tone - almost a sense of 
relief to have the issue out in the open. Typical of this tone is a letter 
from a chaired professor at an "elite" law school, who expressed "ap-
preciation" for the article and then lightheartedly observed: 
[A]s a treatise-writer, I approach the subject with some degree of bias, 
51. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 73 (concluding, based on survey of my former law clerks, 
that "a 'strong foundation in ethics' is not being built in legal education"). 
52. Law Professor #12, letter dated Nov. 23, 1992, at 4. 
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but I thought your perspective made especially compelling some of the 
concerns that I have reflected in my grumblings at the coffee-table. I 
didn't know that I had so many good arguments, but now I do. Right-
on!53 
Other practical scholars were equally grateful that the growing dis-
junction in law has been brought to the fore, but they also expressed a 
deep bitterness-testament to apparent feelings of isolation and insig-
nificance. A poignant example of this is found in the response from a 
professor of law at a well-regarded, midwestern law school: 
Your [article has] restored dignity, self-esteem, and courage to those of 
us who have dedicated our lives to the daunting and lonely task of pub-
lishing authoritative treatises . 
. . . Few in academia have cared ... whether my work is any good (a 
perfectly legitimate issue, of course); instead, the work has consistently 
been belittled as unworthy of a real scholar. What began in joy has been 
transformed into a process of increasingly isolated despair .... 
Your writing has retaught me what I should never have forgotten: I 
may be an inferior scholar, but not because of my choice of publications. 
This means more to me than you can imagine. 54 
C. Students and Recent Graduates 
Several students and recent graduates wrote to me, expressing their 
concerns about the problems identified by the article, particularly the 
trend toward more and more interdisciplinary and theory-oriented 
courses in law school curricula. (I have also heard many such com-
ments from the law clerks with whom I have worked and from the 
students I have taught over the past decade.) No doubt those who 
wrote and spoke to me do not speak for all law students. But the 
responses I include here do indicate a significant element in student 
sentiment. A recent graduate of one of the "elite" law schools stated: 
I'm sad to report that many of the systemic and institutional criticisms 
you level against the "elite" law schools apply to [my alma mater, in-
cluding] ... [t]he proliferation of boutique legal specialties within the 
law school; the appearance of young faculty members with no practical 
experience, clerkships or other significant credentials except for maybe a 
graduate degree in social science; and the patronizing view of some 
faculty toward students who pursue a more traditional legal education. 
. . . I believe some of the classes I took were from the brightest and 
most rigorous minds in the legal academy. But I worry for the future, 
and I hope the Dean and the [hiring committee at my alma mater] take 
your article very seriously. 55 
53. Law Professor #15, letter dated Nov. 24, 1992, at 1; see also supra text accompanying 
note 37. 
54. Law Professor #16, letter dated Apr. 13, 1993, at 1. 
55. Recent Graduate #1, letter dated Jan. 22, 199[3], at 1. 
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The idea that we should "worry for the future" because of current 
hiring policies was presented even more forcefully in a letter from a 
third-year student at an "elite" law school. This student also offered 
several trenchant observations on the general drift toward "impracti-
cal" courses: 
First, I wholeheartedly agree with your complaint that Law Schools 
are becoming too much like graduate schools. Before attending Law 
School I went to graduate school for four years, but after getting my 
degree I decided to change careers. A primary motivation underlying 
my decision was that what I learned in graduate school, while interesting 
and stimulating, simply wasn't practical enough. I wanted a more 
"hands-on" sort of career where I could work with real people and real 
problems. Before enrolling, I knew virtually nothing about the current 
of change running through the legal academy and was quickly discour-
aged at how much time is devoted to abstract problems of little practical 
significance. 
In my first year, I had a roughly equal number of "practical" and 
"interdisciplinary" professors. After reading your article I was struck by 
how significant the differences in pedagogic approach really were. 
"Practical" professors gave me the tools to tackle more advanced sub-
jects and without even realizing it I have gravitated towards courses 
taught by professors with similar styles. Consequently, there are gaps in 
my education because I have avoided courses on potentially useful and 
interesting topics because I knew the professors had little to offer that I 
could someday apply. · 
Second, if anything, I think you underestimate the strength of the 
changing tide you have identified. This year I am fortunate enough to 
serve as one of the student representatives to the faculty hiring commit-
tee. I have been profoundly discouraged at the types of people the 
faculty has chosen to invite for campus interviews. So far this semester 
we have heard from only "impractical" scholars. Their credentials were 
fine and their talks were interesting but what they are interested in seems 
completely beside[] the point. Throughout my time at [this law school] 
the students have bee1,1 asking for more [practical courses and professors 
to teach them]. With one exception . . . these complaints have gone 
unheeded. · 
I really fear for [this law school]. Within the next few years, many of 
the most distinguished professors here . . . will be approaching retire-
ment. I would place all of these people squarely in the "practical" camp 
and they remain among the most loved members of the faculty. But, 
they are being replaced by people of a very different stripe. I won't name 
names, but I think it is true, and the students recognize it, that the 
younger professors have a very different agenda. 56 
A recent graduate of a large, highly regarded law school in the 
midwest added that the student-run law review boards should share 
some of the blame for the existing quality of scholarship today: 
56. Student #1, letter dated Nov. 27, 1992, at 1-2. 
2212 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:2191 
I think it is time for the students at the law reviews to start demanding 
better articles. I served on [my law school's law review]. I recently 
picked up the last issue - curious to see what it contained. Quite hon-
estly, I could not understand two of the articles. As you note, the audi-
ence for these articles are not the people who have anything to do with 
actually shaping the law. 57 
The ideals of ethical practice and a commitment to public service 
were also a source of concern. The third-year student quoted above 
reinforced the point that massive law school debts may greatly influ-
ence the career choices of students who might otherwise seek more 
public-oriented jobs when they first graduate: 
[Y]our observations about students' creeping materialism and lack of in-
terest in public service are accurate, but, I think you have ignored one 
significant aspect of the problem, the cost of legal education. When I 
graduate, I will owe approximately $75,000 and be facing loan payments 
of roughly $1000 per month. This is a real dilemma for me and many of 
my friends. I don't want to let finances dictate my career choices but at 
the same time they are hard to ignore. At this point, I can't honestly say 
which path I will take. It is not a decision I relish. 58 
This student also related a truly troubling description of his law 
school's apparent expectation that its graduates should go on to big 
law firms and bring in hefty salaries: 
I think one unexpected side-effect of the tremendous rise in starting 
salaries at the "elite" law firms has been to change the way Law Schools 
project revenues and balance budgets. I remember a talk given by the 
Placement Director my first year in school. [The Director] explained 
why tuition was so high and financial aid so scarce. [The Director then] 
said the school could afford to be tight-fisted because they expected us to 
go out and make a lot of money, both in the summer and after we gradu-
ate. I know times are tough for all colleges and universities ... but this 
attitude seems short-sighted. Not only are young lawyers expected to 
become fungible billing units for their firms, they are expected to become 
cash cow alumni for their alma mater. 59 
The specters of law school debts and limited career choices are con-
cerns that I have heard over and over again from law students in re-
cent years. 
D. Members of the Bar 
A number of practicing attorneys responded to the article, includ-
ing the managing partners of several major law firms, as well as former 
presidents of both the American Bar Association and the New York 
State Bar Association. These attorneys shared my concerns about the 
57. Recent Graduate #2, letter dated Jan. 23, 1993, at 2. 
58. Student #1, letter dated Nov. 27, 1992, at 2. 
59. Id. 
August 1993] A Postscript 2213 
importance of reemphasizing practical scholarship and pedagogy and 
the necessity of preserving (through teaching and through vigilant ef-
forts by practicing lawyers) a set of norms that serve as the foundation 
for ethical practice. 
· The thoughts of the managing partner of a large law firm in At-
lanta, Georgia are representative of the considerable alienation from 
the academy that a number of practitioners expressed: 
For several years now, I have been experiencing a growing sense of 
alarm at what you call the disjunction between legal education and the 
legal profession. To me, it is far more serious than the neutral term 
"disjunction" implies. At its worst, it is a rejection of the fundamental 
principles of the American legal system. Movements such as critical 
legal studies, critical race studies, feminist legal studies, alternative juris-
prudence and "story telling" are all too often highly politicized, ideologi-
cal movements that do little for the tradition of principled decision 
making which is at the heart of American notions of fairness. Worse 
than that, three years of observing the intemperate clashes among profes-
sors adhering to conflicting schools of thought does little to advance a 
student's understanding of ethical practice and the importance of dealing 
with adversaries candidly and courteously.60 
Several lawyers conveyed a sense of alienation from the academy in 
briefer, but no less biting, remarks. For example, an eminent appellate 
practitioner opined that "[t]here is a substantial amount of 'emperor's 
new clothes' being peddled in the law schools these days."61 And a 
distinguished partner in a major law firm called the disjunction be-
tween teaching and practice "the elephant sitting in the comer of this 
profession for too many years now."62 Plainly dubious of the practical 
skills of the newest generation of legal scholars, he added: 
I dearly would love to see some of the younger "theoretical" mem-
bers of any major law faculty argue a real case in front of the Supreme 
Court (sans doctrine, of course), or even argue a tough motion before a 
smart [United States] District [Court] judge .... Alternatively, I'd like to 
see them sit down privately with members of the House or Senate, and 
answer their questions about how to craft a fair and workable piece of 
legislation, based solely on theory. If they actually tried this, maybe the 
dichotomy you identified wouldn't exist any more. On the other hand, 
many of them would be so bad at it that things might get worse, not 
better.63 
A former president of the American Bar Association and nation-
ally known lawyer suggests that law schools could make considerable 
60. Practitioner #2, letter dated Feb. 1, 1993, at 1. 
61. Practitioner #4, letter dated Dec. 8, 1992, at 1. 
62. Practitioner #3, letter dated Nov. 30, 1992, at 1. 
63. Id. at 3. 
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progress in curricular reform by increasing the teaching role of practi-
tioners and judges: 
Developments in law school curricula in recent years (frequently in 
the schools not numbered as the "elite") strongly suggest that by better 
relating legal education to lawyer performance in the world of lawyering 
it is indeed possible effectively to teach prospective lawyers ... and with 
great benefit both to the student and to the legal profession. 
I would suggest that a quality program of sequential instruction in 
lawyering skills and values, rich in both conceptual and practical ele-
ments, augmented by the participation of judges and experienced lawyers 
in the academic program, can insure that prospective lawyers learn their 
lawyering skills in a manner that will permit them to build upon a sound 
doctrinal framework and confidently to undertake things they have 
never done before and to accomplish appropriate results in the client-
centered world of lawyering. 64 
Several practitioners were also plainly troubled by the tension be-
tween ethical practice and the persistent drive for increased profits. 
The managing partner of a prominent firm in Chicago, with offices in 
many other cities, remarked: 
As to the state of the profession, I think the problem is quite serious, 
particularly among the very well paid lawyers (in large firms and small), 
many of whom like to think that they set a good tone for the perpetua-
tion of professional values. When the goal of lawyers is to maximize 
their own interest against the interests of their clients and, indeed, soci-
ety, and when the goal of partners is to maximize their earnings against 
the earnings of other partners, we really cease to deserve the special 
treatment we seek as a profession and not as a business. I feel very 
strongly about this .... That means that we never lead the Hit Parade in 
the financial performance tables that are published by our friends at [a 
popular legal periodical] - so be it. 6s 
A named partner at one of the major law firms in Washington, D.C., 
suggested that principles of ethical practice do, in fact, influence the 
behavior of many firms and individual lawyers: 
I must also agree with much of your criticism of the profession for 
the growing emphasis on commercialism and the bottom line. However, 
at the same time there are many lawyers and law firms who resist these 
pressures and remain devoted to the principle that the practice of the law 
is affected by the public interest. 
After all, it was the organized bar, speaking primarily through the 
ABA, that saved the Legal Services Corporation, and it was the leaders 
of the bar who responded to President Kennedy's call and established 
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Happily, that tra-
dition, that sense of public obligation, is still alive despite other 
64. Practitioner #5, letter dated Dec. 8, 1992, at 1-2. 
65. Practitioner #6, letter dated Jan. 6, 1993, at 1-2. 
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pressures. 66 
This same partner opined that effectively teaching ethics depended 
in significant part on having faculty members who have been practic-
ing lawyers and have experienced, firsthand, the ethical problems 
faced by practitioners: 
Indeed, I have always thought that it is a good idea for law teachers to 
have some experience in practice before they go into teaching - to have 
some exposure to what goes on in the real world and how there can be 
difficult and even excruciating problems of conflicts, ethics, candor, and 
even civility which are beyond the contemplation of one who has not 
experienced them in practice. 67 
The responses from these and other practitioners are significant 
not only because they tend to support the thesis that there is a disjunc-
tion between the academy and legal practice, but because they support 
that thesis in many of the same ways as the responses received from 
members of the academy. 
E. Members of the Judiciary 
My colleagues on the bench also expressed significant agreement 
with the view that there is a disjunction between legal education and 
legal practice. A large measure of the responses I received from judges 
were simple concurrences, such as one Supreme Court Justice's note 
that the article "coincides with many of my concerns about the legal 
profession today."68 Others were more animated in their observations. 
One U.S. Court of Appeals judge quipped, "Your criticism of legal 
education is right on target. The more I hear about what is going on 
in law schools, the more it seems like never-never land. " 69 Another 
U.S. Court of Appeals judge simply declared, "Amen!"70 
I also received lengthier reflections on the topics treated in the arti-
cle. One U.S. Court of Appeals judge sharply criticized what he per-
ceived as the pernicious effects of the trend toward more "impractical" 
work, a trend he traced to student demands for changes in the law 
school curriculum: 
The only place I part company with you in your article is that I think 
you have made too many concessions to political correctness. Although 
I believe the law schools have an obligation to listen to the various stu-
dent constituencies who have some very valid points to make, I do not 
believe that the response of the law schools in tinkering with the curricu-
66. Practitioner #1, letter dated Nov. 25, 1992, at 2. 
67. Id. 
68. Justice #2, letter dated Nov. 24, 1992, at 1. 
69. Judge #3, undated letter, at 1. 
70. Judge #4, letter dated Nov. 20, 1992, at 1. 
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lum in the manner they have done is the appropriate one. At most of the 
elite law schools today, there are no required courses after the first year. 
In the second and third years oflaw school, students no longer study law 
but, rather, graze their way through a smorgasb[or]d of boutique offer-
ings more closely aligned to the social sciences than the law. Although 
LSAT scores may be higher than ever, I am shocked at the number of 
poorly trained young men and women who[m] I see emerging from the 
nation's finest law schools. 
My concerns in this area are exacerbated by the direction in which 
most of the nation's elite law schools are heading. [The "elite" law 
school at which I teach a course] is a classic example. The law faculty 
for all practical purposes selects the dean, or at least has veto power over 
anyone suggested, and together with the dean, they become a tightly knit 
screening committee, making sure only those of similar ilk are 
admitted .... 
It is . . . hard to mount much of a hue and cry from the alumni. 
When I attend ... meetings [at the law school], for example, most of the 
people who return are caught up in their justifiable love for [their alma 
mater] and the nostalgia they feel as a result of being back [here] .... 
That, coupled with the dog and pony show invariably put on by the law 
school, is not likely to generate any great outcry against what is going on 
today.71 
One U.S. Court of Appeals judge was not as negative in his ap-
praisal of the current state of legal education. This judge suggested 
that the primary problem in legal education was merely the obsoles-
cence of the case method: 
I am not in disagreement with the overemphasis on "Law-and" courses. 
I do think that the Law Schools can do clinical work and do the basic 
core courses well .... But I do disagree with what I think is your conclu-
sion that the Law Schools are failing in their mission of turning ou[t] 
good lawyers, or that the bar is really more critical of the product than it 
was 25 years ago. I think that the problem has much more to do with 
the fact that the great reform of Langdell has outlived its usefulness, and 
that the case method of teaching is unworkable. This has more to do 
with the fact that judges (read Justices) write too long, too multifari-
ously, and too independently. It isn't only that there are no Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes type justices; it's that his model is not deemed worthy of 
emulation by any judges. Judges always think it's more important that 
they voice their unique ratio decidendi for every case that comes before 
them. As a result, every important case sheds more confusion than light, 
and as teaching tools they are awful.72 
I agree that the case method has its drawbacks, and that it can 
actually be a liability in advanced courses. But I do not believe that 
the pedagogical problems in law schools today can be reduced to the 
observation that Langdell's approach may be obsolete. In addition, 
71. Judge #1, letter dated Feb. 5, 1993, at 2. 
72. Judge #5, letter dated Dec. 13, 1992, at 1. 
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even if the profession is no more critical today than it was twenty-five 
years ago of the quality of either the graduates or the scholarly re-
search produced by law schools (a point I am not prepared to con-
cede), that fact alone is hardly a justification for complacency on the 
part of law schools. 73 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
As I have already acknowledged, it is surely unwise to generalize 
with too much certainty about a set of responses such as those I re-
ceived in reaction to my article. I ·do believe, however, that the re-
sponses collected here indicate that I am by no means alone in my 
concern for the current state of legal education and the legal profes-
sion. To me, then, the question is no longer whether there is a prob-
lem, or even what the basic nature of the problem is. Rather, in my 
view, our mission now should be to search for solutions. 
The American Bar Association's report on Legal Education and 
Professional Development - An Educational Continuum, 74 written by 
a distinguished panel oflegal practitioners and scholars, is a step in the 
right direction. Fortunately, there have been noteworthy follow-ups 
to the ABA Task Force Report: in February 1993, Emory University 
School of Law sponsored a major conference on excellence in the legal 
profession, focusing on a number of the issues covered by "The Grow-
ing Disjunction"; in April 1993, New York University Law School 
convened a gathering of practitioners and law faculty members to dis-
cuss the implications of the Task Force Report; in June 1993, Case 
Western Reserve University Law School, along with the Center for 
Professional Responsibility of the ABA and the American Bar Foun-
dation, hosted a conference of leaders in the legal profession from 
around the country to consider an agenda for the profession for the 
next century; and, of course, there is this symposium edition of the 
Michigan Law Review, devoted principally to the issues raised in "The 
Growing Disjunction." Open dialogue on these issues is bound to 
help. 
There are skeptics, however. One law professor at a major eastern 
law school posed the following question: 
Upon reading the article, I was struck b[y] how reasonable and even 
73. Furthermore, given the problems now being faced by the practicing bar, some cynics 
might wonder whether practitioners' assessments rest on a flawed set of values. For some recent 
commentary on the plight of law firms, see generally Barbara Buchholz, The Melting Pots, 
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 62; Don J. DeBenedictis, Growing Pains, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 52; 
Patrick Capuano, All This and Fired, Too, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 58. 
74. See supra note 6. 
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modest your proposal is. You do not argue that legal academics should 
stop engaging in pure theory, but merely that they should realize that 
there is an important role for practical scholarship as well. This, to my 
mind, leads to an interesting question: If your proposal is so sensible, 
why doesn't it immediately meet with universal acceptance? (I am pre-
dicting that it won't.)75 
He is of the view that, because the "political" divisions in law faculties 
are too great and those in power have too much to lose, meaningful 
change is unlikely. A nationally recognized, preeminent chaired pro-
fessor from a major east coast law school viewed the problem in some-
what similar terms, but was a bit more optimistic: 
Hopefully, the [ABA] Task Force Report will also help to nudge some 
law schools back onto the road oflaw, if only by giving deans who want 
to move in that direction some ABA-backed language to quote to poten-
tial funding sources. (As you indicate, nudging is probably the best tool 
for the task at this point. Cudgeling mules with sticks is seldom the 
formula for progress, but the particular breed of mule now dominating 
legal education seems too dumb to appreciate the nourishment value of 
carrots.)76 
I hope that these skeptics are wrong, but I too harbor some doubts 
about the capacity of the profession to right itself. As a start, I think 
that those of us who lobbied to open up the law schools to the perspec-
tives of other disciplines and ways of thinking may bear a special re-
sponsibility to ensure that law schools retain their basic sense of 
purpose. But the entire legal academic community must work collec-
tively to find a middle ground where a greater number of practical 
scholars flourish alongside their theory-oriented counterparts in an en-
vironment of mutual respect; both should contribute to an education 
for students that better prepares them for practice, and both should 
share the fundamental belief that scholarship that seeks to inform and 
guide practitioners, legislators, other policymakers, and judges is a val-
uable, indeed necessary, component of any law school's mission. Nor 
should the academy be the only focus of attention. The members of 
the practicing bar must - if they wish to remain in a profession - put 
forth a significantly greater effort toward achieving the ideal of ethical 
practice, an ideal from which too many firms and individual attorneys 
appear to have strayed. 
I applaud the Michigan Law Review for sponsoring this sympo-
sium, for it helps to further an important public debate. However, we 
are all familiar with the epigram that "when all is said and done, a lot 
more is said than done." Symposia are generally focused on saying, 
75. Law Professor #4, letter dated Dec. 22, 1992, at 1. 
76. Law Professor #14, letter dated Dec. 4, 1992, at 1. 
August 1993] A Postscript 2219 
not doing, and I fear that without a great effort by the legal commu-
nity as a whole, our well-meaning discussions will not lead to concrete, 
effective, and lasting reforms in the academy and in the profession. 
This failure would be a tragedy, for we have already focused our 
thinking enough to identify and analyze the problems we face. It is 
now time to pursue solutions to the growing disjunction between legal 
education and the legal profession. 
